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Do Incentives for REIT Executives Improve Efficiency?

Abstract
Using 1998-2005 EXECUCOMP data on Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) CEOs,
this study addresses some of the issues that arise when modeling CEO incentive-based
compensation. The purpose is to investigate how profit efficiencies are impacted by CEO
compensation and their composition of pay packages. Since a disproportionate amount of a
REITs expenses are executive compensation related, this issue is particularly important. Much
of the literature focuses on estimating the impact of firm and CEO characteristics on CEO
compensation. We consider the more direct question of whether total CEO compensation or the
mix of compensation affects profit efficiency.
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1.

Introduction
There has been much research on incentive based compensation and firm performance

measures; particularly since the 1980’s. Research shows that executive compensation can be as
much at 400 times the earnings of their workers. Additionally research shows that incentive
based executive compensation improves performance of companies as measured by sales
revenues, Economic Value Added (EVA), or the ratio of net income to share price. In the case
of REIT CEOs there is little documented evidence linking any measure of performance and
executive’s compensation. Many question whether CEOs are worth the massive incentive-based
packages. However, higher pay may be justified if it is needed to align CEO incentives with the
goal of maximizing shareholder wealth. For example, Jensen and Murphy (1990) find that
CEO’s receive only $3.25 of shareholder wealth created. Hall and Liebman (1998) show that
CEO compensation is far more sensitive to firm performance if one chooses other measures than
shareholder wealth. They also find pay has become more sensitive over time with increases in
the proportion of incentive-based compensation over time. In fact, the average CEO in our
sample of Real Estate Investment Trusts is paid nearly 70.5% in incentive-based compensation.
Most papers in the CEO literature focus on measuring the sensitivity of CEO compensation to
attributes of the firm to test theories of optimal compensation.
The majority of the prior literature implicitly assumes causality runs from firm
performance to CEO pay. However, the argument in favor of option packages and high pay
hinges on the fact that higher pay also affects firm performance. This paper focuses on the
impact of the executive compensation package on profitability of the firm. In particular, we seek
to analyze the impact of increasing the total executive compensation and the proportion of
executive salaries in incentives on net income of REITs.
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In theory, larger incentive packages could either increase or decrease the net income of
REITs. The incentives directly increase the cost of the REIT which would reduce net income.
However, the intended consequences of the compensation rewards are to enhance productivity of
the executive, thus raising profits. The key question for our study consists of which impact
dominates.
What result might be expected from this exercise and how should the results be
interpreted? Basic economic theory provides some intuition. Observed salaries should be the
result of profit and shareholder wealth maximizing behavior. Thus, salaries should be set by the
firm to attract and retain key executives and incentive structures should be used to maximize
firm performance.
This study uses a stochastic profit frontier to measure how close a CEO is to the bestpractices in the industry. By allowing mean inefficiency to differ across firms based on total
CEO compensation or incentive structure, we seek to more directly investigate the impact of
total and mix of CEO compensation on profits of the firm. Overall, this study finds little or no
evidence, regardless of the definition of high incentive-based compensation, that incentive-based
compensation packages produce more profit efficient CEOs. Although some would suggest that
this result is surprising, it may simply suggest that REIT CEOs are paid efficiently conditional on
their firm environment. Each REIT’s corporate environment is different and each REIT may
have differing objectives for long term versus short term decisions. These differences must be
taken into account when designing the mix of compensation package. If the results had shown
significant differences between compensation packages, then that might suggest that CEO
package mix should be changed for some firms. Disparities between profit efficiency shouldn’t
exist in the long term if markets are efficient. The evidence that we present indicate that a world
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where one size fits all doesn’t exist. Additionally, we find little evidence that the level of
compensation, whether it be incentive-based or not, affects the level of net income at all.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides discussion the existing research on
REIT efficiency and glimpse of the vast literature on executive compensation. Section 3
describes the data collected from the Execucomp data base and elaborates on the different
specifications of high incentive based compensation. Section 4 presents the empirical results and
Section 5 concludes.

2. Literature Overview
Executive compensation directly increases costs. However the purpose of the incentivebased compensation is to increase CEO productivity which may increase revenues or decrease
costs. The fact that net income is affected by CEO pay directly, but that CEO pay may indirectly
affect net income is a cause for concern. Most of the models of executive compensation use
some form of net income as an explanatory variable and CEO compensation as the dependent
variable, implicitly assuming causality runs in a single direction from firm performance to CEO
pay.
Principle agency theory suggests that carefully designed compensation packages motivate
managers with the intention of aligning shareholder objectives with the managers’ objectives.
Along those lines, Jensen and Murphy (1990a) find that firm stock returns may be impacted by
executive stock option awards in a positive, but economically negligible way. They suggest that
CEOs are paid like bureaucrats.
Hall and Liebman (1998) find that the relationship between pay and performance from
1980-94 is greater and economically significant. The difference in the economic value is

3
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attributed to the differences in the mix of the compensation schemes and the fact that the
previous studies used firms that had primarily cash based pay. Murphy (1985) concludes that
there is a relationship between compensation and performance. However, the literature is not in
agreement concerning the link between pay and stock returns. One potential reason for this
disagreement could be due to differences in the definition of pay. Newer models that include
options or bonuses in their computation of pay may by definition lead to at least some
relationship between pay and stock returns (and to some extent net income). Older models that
disproportionately use cash based compensation or salary do not embed this definitional
relationship between net income and compensation. Several papers focus on industry specific
relationships. Smith and Watts (1992) find that the banking industry faces fewer growth
opportunities than other industries. They find that high growth banks tend to use more stockbased compensation while low growth banks use more cash-based pay. Hubbard and Palia
(1995) study pay-for-performance in banks and find that bank CEOs that operate with interstate
branches have higher pay-for-performance. Houston and James (1995) find that bank CEOs
receive less cash and stock based compensation than their CEO counterparts in other industries.
Watts (1992) find that high growth firms use more stock-based pay. Meanwhile, Gaver and
Gaver (1993) find that high growth firms use more stock option awards.
Only a few papers focus on REITs. Hardin (1998) provides some evidence that manager
pay rises when dividend income falls. Chopin et. al. (1995) and Pennathur and Shelor (2002)
find some relationship between pay and stock return as measured by funds from operations.
Scott et. al. (2001) find that the size of the REIT is positively related to total compensation and
incentive compensation is a function of stock return. Pennathur, Gilley and Shelor (2005) find
evidence that is consistent with the theories of stock-based compensation by showing that

4
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increases in growth opportunities, funds from operation, and earnings per share lead to larger
options rewards for REIT CEOs. Pennathur, Gilley and Shelor (2005) also find that CEO pay
rises with greater stock based compensation orgreater volatility of returns.
We find only one paper has attempted the problem modeling profits rather than CEO
compensation. Baek and Pagan (2002) use panel data on S&P 1500 firms and a traditional
stochastic frontier framework to study the relationship between executive compensation and
technical productive efficiency. They find that the level of CEO compensation is positively
related to technical efficiency. However the type of compensation mattered. Annual salary,
restricted stock and stock options as a percentage of their compensation are each negatively
related to technical efficiency.
Along the lines of the traditional approach to link executive compensation and
performance measures, Koshal, Parsad and Jain (1977) show that executive compensation
depends on sales and profits. However other early research by Lewellen and Huntsman (1970)
find that profits and market capitalization are more important in determining executive
compensation than is sales. Many other studies find themselves with opposing views. Posen
(1990) finds that both market and accounting measures do little to explain executive
compensation. Guy (2000) provides evidence that there is a relationship between executive
compensation and accounting and shareholder return.
When looking at executive compensation from an agency theory point of view,
Holmstrom (1992) finds that firm size should negatively affect compensation sensitivity. Larger
firms exhibit more sensitivity executive pay to performance measures. Wright (2003) uses a
moral hazard framework and finds that firms with greater marginal benefit of effort implement
schemes that induce greater manager effort and less X-efficiency. They find that the manager

5
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selection effect unambiguously increases internal firm efficiency. Garen (1994) suggests that the
base pay performance is negatively related to total assets. He also argues that this result leads
researchers to believe that the size of the firm reduces CEO incentives to work harder and
smarter.
Executive pay seems to be dependent on industry as well. Martinez and Guadalupe
(2004) show that more competition in the industry increases pay sensitivity of managers.
Hubbard and Palia (1995) find that executives of financial institutions’ are paid more than those
in other sectors. Jaskow and Rose (1996) and Murphy (1998) find that executives in regulated
industries like electric utilities are paid less relative to more competitive sectors.
In estimating efficiency, Lewis, Springer and Anderson (2002) examine the impact of the
type of REIT management on operating efficiency by separating the data into self-managed
REITs (self) and externally managed REITs (ext). Since there is a trend toward REITs moving
to self-management, this would lead researcher to believe that self-management must yield
greater efficiencies. In prior research, both Bers and Springer (1998b) and Anderson, Springer,
Fok, et al. (2001) find evidence that external management decreases REIT efficiency. Lewis,
Springer and Anderson show self-managed REITs (self) are more efficient in 1995 and 1996, but
that externally managed REITs (ext) are more efficient in 1997. These results hold consistent
irrespective of whether total assets or market capitalization as the measure of output is used.
This result provides some contrasting evidence against the previous REIT efficiency research.
Much research has been done in the area of stochastic frontier analysis within a real
estate context (Anderson, Lewis, and Springer (2000), Anderson, Springer, Fok, and Webb
(2001) and Ambrose and Pennington-Cross (2000)). These studies traditionally estimate a longrun average cost curve. Based on the parameters of that function, they assess the firm’s position

6
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relative to that average cost curve. Using this information, these papers were able to estimate Xefficiency, industry efficiency and scale efficiency.
Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993) suggest that the use of an X-efficiency method to
determine the presence of economies of scale is important because scale results are only
meaningful if a firm is operating on its efficient frontier. Berger suggests using profit frontiers
rather than cost and production frontiers because a profit frontier gives a more general sense of
the manager’s efficiency. In profit frontiers, both sales revenue and cost efficiencies are taken
into consideration.
Other studies like Anderson, Springer, Fok and Webb (2001) use data envelopment
analysis (DEA) to estimate economies of scale and X-efficiency for REITs from 1992 through
1996. Their results show that REITs are very inefficient with overall measures ranging from
44.1 percent to 60.5 percent inefficient. They also show most REITs to be operating at
increasing returns to scale. Their results show that increases in both property type diversification
and leverage decrease REIT efficiency performance, and that self-management increases cost
efficiency among REITs. The problem with this research is that DEA classifies any deviation
from the efficient frontier surface as inefficiency. Thus, DEA does not allow deviations from the
frontier to be measured as random error, but classifies all deviations from the frontier as
inefficiency. It is also the case that DEA is very sensitive to model specification and outlying
observations.
Previous studies have shown that the magnitude of REIT efficiency estimates differ
substantially when other factors affecting REIT costs are controlled for in the model. This study
is the first to use a profit frontier to estimate profit efficiency—a measure incorporating both the
effectiveness of managers to minimize costs and to maximize revenues simultaneously.

7
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Secondly, this paper would be the first to include executive compensation measures into the
frontier estimation. Incorporating executive compensation in to the frontier allows researchers to
estimate the marginal impact of the compensation on profit. Managers whose compensation is
more costly than the additional revenue created by the additional work effort would be deemed
suboptimal or allocatively inefficient.
3.1

The Stochastic Frontier Model for REIT Profit Frontier Model
Bauer (1990) surveys the large literature on stochastic frontier models first introduced by

Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). We specify the
profit frontier to follow a log-log functional form.
Extending the model specification of Bers and Springer (1997,1998a, 1998b) and Lewis,
Springer, and Anderson (2002) the basic log-log profit frontier model is:
(1)

ln  i (Qi )  bo  bi ln Qi  b2 ln Qi2  b3 ln Qi3  bt

2005

 Dum

t 1998

i

 vi  z i

where i denotes the net income available to stockholders of firm i, which depends on a REIT’s
output, Qi. We allow for curvature in the frontier by including squared and cubic terms.
Following Lewis, Springer and Anderson (2002), total assets are defined as the output of a REIT.
The composed error term consists of a symmetric error term, i that captures measurement error
and a non-negative error, zi . As in Lewis, Springer and Anderson (2002), the two-sided error
term is distributed normally, vi ~ IID N(0,  2 ) for all firms. For the non-negative error term, zi ,
follows an exponential distribution with shape parameter The parameter  defines both the
mean and the variance of the exponential distribution and directly provides a measure of
inefficiency. Following the Lewis and Anderson (1999) and Lewis, Springer and Anderson
(2002) methodology, we allow  to take one of two values conditional on firm pay
8
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characteristics, for firms classified as having lower incentives as a proportion of total pay and
for those offering classified as offering a high portion of salaries as incentives.
The priors complete our statistical model. Following Koop, Osiewalski, and Steel
(1994), a flat prior distribution function for is chosen. j is the shape parameter that defines
the mean of the exponential density function, where j represents the REIT type. Fernandez,
Osiewalski, Steel (1998) show that an informative prior for j-1 and is required to ensure that
the posterior is proper, so we choose gamma priors for all j-1 and . The full priors are then:

 ( )  1
(3)

 (1 )  f G (1 | 1, ln( r * ))
 (

2

  2  s 2p 
)  f G  | , 

2 2 


where f G ( | 1 , 2 ) denotes a gamma density with mean 1/2 and variance .
Note that, rji=exp(-zji) measures the efficiency of the ith firm, type j, relative to a 100 percent
efficient firm facing the same input prices, and rj* is the prior mean for the group type’s
efficiency. We set ri =0.875 for all groups, implying we have no prior about whether or not the
REITs’ characteristics influence efficiency. We set 

p

2

to .03, which implies a

weak prior on 2 as well.
Koop, Steel, and Osiewalski (1993) derive the joint conditional density of andfor
the above model. The conditional density functions for j and zij are:
(4)

(5)

p(1| data, z, ,  2 )  p(1| z)  fG (1| n  1, z' i  ln(r * ))
1

p( z| data,  ,  , 

2

n
2
2
)  f N ( z| y  X 
, I  ) I ( zi  0),
 n
i 1
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where   ( X' X ) 1 X' Y  z , and f N (| , ) is a normal density with mean and covariance
matrix , i represents an nx1 vector of ones, In denotes the nxn identity matrix and I(.) is the
indicator function. n represents the total number of firms in the sample and n-  j represents the
number of firms in group j.
Using these conditional densities, the Gibbs sampling algorithm converges to the actual
joint posterior density function as the iterations approach infinity (Tierney, 1991). In this paper,
we generate 20,000 parameter vectors and drop the first 2,000 to avoid sensitivity to starting
values.1

4. Data Definitions
To compute REIT efficiency with the Bayesian stochastic frontier model, we use data
collected for 1998-2005 that include information on publicly traded REITs listed in the
ExecuComp data base. The final sample consists of data for 128 observations of U.S. REIT/CEO salary pairs. Table 1 shows summary statistics for the data. Note that the average REIT
CEO’s total compensation was 70.5% incentive-based.
The empirical model requires data for net income (Y), REIT output (X), and executive
compensation. As noted in Anderson et al. (2001) the important issue in the choice of the output
measure is whether total assets are an adequate proxy for the value of the properties underlying
the REITs and whether the measure is consistent between REITs. Following Bers and Springer
(1997, 1998a,b) and Anderson et al. (2001), we define the measure of REIT output as Total
Assets. Although some may argue that REITs output should be measured as Market

1

Koop, Steel and Osiewalski (1994) show that the standard errors for the Gibbs sampler are nearly equal to the
standard errors that would be generated from sampling directly from the joint posterior density.
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Capitalization, the product of the number of shares outstanding and the year-end stock price,
Lewis, Springer and Anderson (2002) find that Total Assets has a high correlation with Market
Capitalization and a smaller variance than Market Capitalization. They find that Total Assets as
the measure for output has yielded more consistent results, and, if it has a bias, it has shown a
conservative bias.
One key challenge for this study lies in dividing firms into those with a high and low
level of incentive-based compensation. To understand the nature of our problem, note that the
above model implicitly assumes that firms are exogenously sorted into two categories of high
and low levels of incentive based compensation. However, one would clearly expect that
bonuses and the value of stock options rise with net income. Thus, not only could the proportion
of compensation due to incentives be exogenous, the causality may run from net income to
incentive structure rather than vice versa. This presents a difficult challenge for this study
because we know of prior econometric research on estimating a stochastic frontier model where
the efficiency parameter varies across groups defined on the basis of a latent endogenous
variable.2 In light of the above problem, we utilize an alternative strategy of using three different
definitions of high incentive based compensation. The idea is to highlight the problem using
comparisons across the three measures. The first measure simply defines those firms with
greater than the median level of incentives as a percent of total pay as high incentive-based and
should suffer from the most endogeniety. Intuitively, higher net income should raise incentives
during a given year. This tends to push firms with higher net income into the high incentivebased compensation category, biasing results towards finding that high incentives lead to greater

2

This econometric problem poses an interesting question for future research.However, even if this problem
is solved it may not provide a useful solution for this REIT application given both the sample size and difficulty of
finding valid instruments.
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efficiency. The next two measures break the linkage by looking at measures of the average
proportion of the executive’s pay attributable to efficiency across all years where the firm
appears in the sample.
The total executive compensation measures include non-incentive based compensation
and incentive based compensation. Non-incentive based compensation includes base salary and
other annual compensation not included in salary or bonus and all other compensation that is not
incentive based such as severance pay, debt foregiveness, imputed interest, payouts for
cancellation of stock options, payment for unused vacation, tax reimbursements, signing
bonuses, 401K contributions, life insurance and premiums. Incentive based compensation
includes bonuses, the value of restricted stock granted during the year and the Black-Scholes
value of new options granted.
Figure 1 contains a histogram of the percent of incentives as a percent of the executive’s
pay. Note that there is substantial variation across the sample with a median of .7686. Our first
measure classifies an observation as high incentive if the incentive-based compensation share of
the executive’s pay is greater than or equal to .7686. This leads to 64 observations classified as
high incentive with 64 left as lower incentive. As previously stated, there is clearly a likelihood
that firms with higher net income awarded higher incentives. Thus, this measure is likely to
suffer from the endogeneity problem discussed above and bias.

12
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Figure 1: Percent Incentives
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Note: Computed as bonuses and options divided by total salary.

The second measure proposed attempts to weaken the link between net income and
incentives to focus on the firm’s package rather than a single year. The strategy is to compute
the average percentage of incentives in the executive’s pay for each firm across all years where
the firm appears in our sample. In essence, this measure defines high incentive based on the
average package offered by the firm over a number of years.
Figure 2 graphs the histogram of the average percent incentives defined by firm. For this
measure, we define a firm as offering high incentives if the mean percent of incentives in total
pay is greater than or equal to the median of .7047. For this measure, 70 observations fall into
the high incentive category, leaving 58 as low incentive. Note that 106 of 128 are defined the
same under both measures and 22 observations switch either from high incentive to low
incentive or vice versa across measures.
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Figure 2: Mean Incentives by Firm
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Note: Computed by averaging incentives for each firm.

A similar method is used to group observations into high total compensation and low
total compensation. Again, two procedures are used. The first, based on comparing observations
to the median of all observations, is again most likely to suffer from bias. The second attempts
to address the problem of possible endogeneity in the grouping by grouping based on comparing
firm averages across all years to the median of this measure across all firms.
As in previous studies (Bers and Springer, 1997, 1998a,b; Anderson et al, 2001 and
Lewis, Springer and Anderson 2002), we examine REIT performance conditional on REIT
characteristics regarding executive compensation. Namely, a stochastic profit frontier is
constructed conditional on the percentage of executive compensation that comes from incentive
based compensation verses non-incentive based compensation.

14

https://digitalcommons.subr.edu/cbej/vol9/iss3/1

16

Lewis and Terrell: Incentives for REIT Executives

5.

Results
Table 2 contains the results based on the methodology discussed above. As previously

discussed, the basic frontier consists of year dummies, the natural logarithm of the market value
of assets, log assets squared and log assets cubed. All models allow for two possible inefficiency
parameters, measuring inefficiency of low percent incentive-based (salary) observations and
measuring inefficiency of high percent incentive-based (salary) observations.
Column 1 of Table 2 examines the profit frontier by defining those firms with greater
than the median level of incentives as a percent of total pay as high incentive-based CEOs. This
model should suffer from the most endogeniety. Intuitively, higher net income should raise
incentives during a given year. This tends to push firms with higher net income into the high
incentive-based compensation category, biasing results towards finding that high incentives lead
to greater efficiency. We model profit as a function of dummy variables for each year, and the
multiple terms for market value of assets to allow for curvature and inflection point in the
frontier. The first group () represents the inefficiency of the low incentive compensation group
of REITs while the second group (represents the high incentive compensation group of REITs.
Note that

E[1 ]

 E[ 1 ] . In this model we see some of the strongest evidence that high
E[2 ]
2

incentive based CEOs are more profit efficient than low incentive based CEOs. Not only is the
result economically significant, but the probability that low incentive-based CEOs are less
efficient is 77.2%. However, these results are erroneous due to endogeniety.

15
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Table 2: Bayesian Stochastic Frontier Results

Variable
1998 Dummy
1999 Dummy
2000 Dummy
2001 Dummy
2002 Dummy
2003 Dummy
2004 Dummy
2005 Dummy
Ln(Market Value)
Ln(Market
Value)2
Ln(Market
Value)3
2



Prob(

% Incentive Based Compensation
High defined by
High defined by
observation
Firm
4.380
4.401
(0.557)
(0.577)
4.595
4.598
(0.566)
(0.560)
4.566
4.582
(0.172)
(0.174)
4.354
4.353
(0.182)
(0.184)
4.564
4.561
(0.143)
(0.142)
4.290
4.283
(0.131)
(0.128)
4.039
4.039
(0.130)
(0.129)
4.301
4.309
(0.149)
(0.149)
0.880
0.887
(0.103)
(0.104)
0.234
0.236
(0.132)
(0.132)
-0.092
-0.093
(0.047)
(0.047)
0.162
0.159
(0.035)
(0.035)
0.421
0.398
(0.083)
(0.081)
0.351
0.390
(0.082)
(0.081)
1.254
1.055
(0.353)
(0.262)
0.772
0.536

Total Compensation
High defined by
observation
4.390
(0.574)
4.599
(0.560)
4.586
(0.174)
4.369
(0.185)
4.581
(0.146)
4.303
(0.152)
4.044
(0.133)
4.303
(0.152)
0.877
(0.105)
0.230
(0.133)
-0.091
(0.047)
0.162
(0.037)
0.435
(0.088)
0.342
(0.083)
1.336
(0.392)
0.825

High defined by
Firm
4.392
(0.577)
4.620
(0.586)
4.579
(0.172)
4.350
(0.182)
4.559
(0.143)
4.280
(0.130)
4.035
(0.129)
4.302
(0.150)
0.892
(0.101)
0.233
(0.131)
-0.092
(0.047)
0.160
(0.035)
0.392
(0.078)
0.390
(0.086)
1.043
(0.272)
0.511

Note: There were 128 observations for each model.
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Column 2 of Table 2 attempts to address endogeniety issue by examining the
profit frontier produced by defining those CEOs with greater than the 5-year median level
of incentives as a percent of total pay, as high incentive-based CEOs. After controlling
for the endogeniety, we find no evidence that the two groups of CEOs have different
profit efficiencies. Not only are the ineffiencies nearly equal, the probability that low
incentive-based CEOs are more inefficient than high incentive based CEOs is only
53.6%. This result indicates that the current pay composition is optimal given the
environments that each of these CEOs work in. Even those that are paid with relatively
low incentives are just as effective at producing profits as are their high incentive
counterparts. However, just because REITs are tending to pay more incentive-based
rewards doesn’t mean that CEOs are paid too much. We interpret this result as CEO
compensation is appropriately composed of an optimal mix of incentive-base and nonincentive-based rewards.
Column 3 of Table 2 attempts to shed light on the magnitude of the compensation
packages. Like in Column 1, we define the high group as those CEOs with greater than
the median level of total pay. We anticipate that this model should suffer from a
significant amount of endogeniety, particularly in light of the fact that the more recent
trends are to load the CEOs total compensation up with incentives. Like model one, we
find this model indicates the most difference in the two groups. The low compensation
group is more inefficient than the high compensation group. The bias in the results not
only increases the economic impact of CEO compensation, but it also biases the
significance. The posterior probability that the low compensation CEOs are more
inefficient than the high compensation CEOs is 82.5% in this model.
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Column 4 of Table 2 addresses the endogeniety between net income and
executive compensation by defining the high total compensation group as CEOs who are
above then median 5-year total compensation level. Like model 2, we find that there is
little or no difference in profit efficiency between the highly compensated and their lowly
compensated counterparts. Once again, this offers evidence that the overall level of CEO
compensation does not seem to affect profit efficiency. That is, the compensation adds to
expenses, but is offset by greater productivity indicating that there is no evidence that
REIT CEOs are overpaid. In fact, we interpret this as evidence that CEOs are paid
optimally.

6.

Conclusion
What does this mean? We consider four models of profit; two that depend of the

percent of incentive based compensation and two models that depend on total
compensation. Using a form of the dependent variable (compensation) as an explanatory
variable clearly generates the possibility of an endogeniety problem. Models of profit
that adjust for the endogeniety provide no evidence that the composition of CEO pay is
sub-optimal.

That is, both models show that there is little or no difference in profit

efficiency between CEOs that are paid high levels of total compensation and those that
are paid low levels. It is also the case that we find no evidence that high incentive-based
compensation packages create higher profits.
This evidence lead us to believe that total compensation or the mix of the
compensation matters, but that the current compensation decisions of REIT boards appear
to be optimal. That is, every REIT has a different corporate environment and/or set of
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objectives and a set mix of compensation or magnitude of compensation is not
appropriate for all. One shoe doesn’t fit all foot sizes. Because of the heterogeneous set
of circumstance that each REIT faces, each REIT compensation board must set rewards
in conjunction with their specific fund objectives. Our results suggest that REIT boards
may be optimally setting compensation packages both in the mix and magnitude of
rewards for CEOs.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics

Variable
Total Salary
Fixed Salary
Incentives
Percent Incentives

Mean
$2,575.4
$531.1
$2,044.2
0.705

Standard
Deviation
$1,924.7
$277.5
$1,802.5
0.230

Minimum
$50.1
$0.1
$0.0
0.000

Maximum
$9,535.3
$1,428.5
$8,725.1
0.999

Net Income
Market Value
ln(Net Income)
ln(market value)

$206.7
$3,929.7
4.869
0.955

$182.5
$3,517.0
1.098
0.960

$0.5
$262.5
-0.654
-1.338

$861.8
$17,213.3
6.759
2.846
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